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INVITEE AND RETREAT RULE IN CRIMINAL LAW
American courts are not in accord as to whether a person not
at fault in bringing on an attack may kill in self-defense even thought
a safe means of retreat is available to him' A majority of jurisdictions
follow a non-retreat rule2 under which one who is unlawfully assaulted
and reasonably fears that he will be killed or that great bodily harm
will be inflicted upon him may, without being obliged to retreat, use
force to the extent of killing the assailant.3 In other words, "A person
is not required to risk a retreat from an unjustified threatened attack." 4
A minority of jurisdictions today5 follow a retreat rule6 under which
a person not at fault is required to retreat if the assaulted party can
thus avoid the imminent danger without killing his assailant.7
'Perkins, Criminal Law 894 (1957).
-Seward v. State, 228 Ark. 712, 310 S.W.2d 239 (1958); People v. Collins, 189 Cal.
App. 2d 575, 11 Cal. Ptr. 504 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961);Enyard v. People, 67 Colo.
434, i8o Pac. 722 (1919); Ragland v. State, III Ga. 211, 36 S.E. 682 (19oo); People v.
Bush, 414 Ill. 441, 111 N.E.2d 326 (1953); Bange v. State, 237 Ind. 422, 146
N.E.2d 811 (1958); State v. Hatch, 57 Kan. 420, 46 Pac. 708 (1896); Caudill v. Com-
monwealth, 234 Ky. 142, 27 S.W.2d 705 (1930); State v. Boudreaux, 185 La. 434,
169 So. 459 (1936); Pitts v. State, 211 Miss. 268, 51 So. 2d 448 (1951); State v. Merk,
53 Mont. 454, 164 Pac. 655 (1917); State v. Bartlett, 170 Mo. 658, 71 S.W. 148 (1902);
State v. Gimmett, 33 Nev. 531, 112 Pac. 273 (1910); People v. Ligouri, 284 N.Y.
309, 31 N.E.2d 37 (1940); State v. Frizzelle, 243 N.C. 49, 89 S.E.d 725 (1955); Perez
v. State, 51 Okla. Crim. 18o, 300 Pac. 428 (1931); Graham v. State, 98 Ohio St. 77,
12o N.E. 232 (1918); State v. Rader, 94 Ore. 432, 184 Pac. 79 (1919); Lopez v. State,
152 Tex. Crim. 562, 216 S.W.2d 183 (1949); Stoneham v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 523,
1o S.E. 238 (1889); State v. Hiatt, 187 Wash. 226, 6o P.2d 71 (1936); State v. Zan-
nino, 129 W. Va. 755, 41 S.E.2d 641 (1947); Miller v. State, 139 Wis. 57, ii9 N.W.
850 (igog).
3Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921); People v. Lewis, 117 Cal. i86,
48 Pac. 1o88 (1897); State v. Hatch, 57 Kan. 420, 46 Pac. 708 (1896); State v. Bart-
lett, 170 Mo. 658, 71 S.W. 148 (1902); Graham v. State, 98 Ohio St. 77, 12o N.E. 232
(1918); State v. Cushing, 14 Wash. 527, 45 Pac. 145 (1896); Palmer v. State, 9 Wyo.
40, 59 Pac. 793 (1900).
'State v. Zannino, 129 W. Va. 775, 41 S.E.2d 641, 645 (1947).
,' Ihe "retreat to the wall" doctrine was early applied by some courts in self-
defense cases. Beale, Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 6 Harv. L. Rev. 567 (1903);
Beale, Homicide in Self-Defense, 3 Colum. L. Rev. 526 (19o3).
"Quillen v. State, 49 Del. 114, 11o A. 2d 445 (1955); Harris v. State, 1o4 So. 2d 739
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); State v. Haffa, 246 Iow1a 1275, 71 N.W.2d 35 (955); State
v. Cox, 138 Me. 151, 23 A.2d 634 (1941); People v. Stallworth, 364 Mich. 528, 111
N.W.2d 742 (1961); State v. Rheams, 34 Minn. 18, 24 N.W. 3o2 (1885); State v.
Pontery, 19 N.J. 457, 117 A.2d 473 (1955); Commonwealth v. McKwayne, 221 Pa.
449, 70 At. 8o9 (19o8); State v. Jackson, 227 S.C. 271, 87 S.E.2d 681 (1955); State
v. Roberts, 63 Vt. 139, 21 AtI. 424 (1891).
7Jackson v. State, 177 Ala. 12, 59 So. 171 (1912); Owens v. State, 64 Fla. 383,
6o So. 340 (1912); State v. Gough, 187 Iowa 363, 174 N.W. 279 (1919); State v.
DiMaria, 88 N.J.L. 416, 97 At. 248 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
CASE COMMENTS
When a person is at fault, however, in bringing on the difficulty
that gives rise to the threat to his life, the general rule in all jurisdic-
tions is that he must retreat before a right of self-defense, justifying
the taking of human life, arises.8 One troublesome aspect of the ap-
plication of these apparently clear rules of self-defense arises when it
is not clear whether the person who kills was at fault or free from
fault.
The problem recently arose in South Carolina, a retreat rule
jurisdiction,9 in the case of State v. Bethea.10 The evidence was con-
flicting, but taking the view of the evidence most favorable to the
defendant, the jury could have found the following: The defendant,
while visiting his mistress in her home and at her invitation, told
her of his intention to sever their illicit relationship. As he spoke, the
mistress became violent and unruly, menacingly waving a pistol, so
that the defendant's efforts to leave the premises were thwarted. Fear-
ing for his life, the defendant drew a pistol and shot the woman who
died a short time later from the wounds so inflicted. In substance, the
defendant asked the court for an instruction that in this view of the
facts an invitee is under no duty to retreat. The prosecution con-
tended that if a safe means of retreat was open, the defendant, al-
though an invitee, was under a duty to retreat rather than to take his
mistress's life. The trial court refused the instruction asked by the
defendant who was subsequently convicted of manslaughter.
On an appeal to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, the convic-
tion was affirmed by a divided court. The majority of the court found
no merit in the defendant's argument that cases involving no duty to
retreat were applicable since the court was of the opinion that the
evidence when viewed most favorably to the defendant showed that
he was not free from fault. Therefore, the court applied the rule ap-
plicable to parties at fault. The dissenting judge, however, viewing
the same evidence believed that the jury might have found that the
defendant was without fault."l Consequently, he thought that the
defendant was entitled to an instruction relating to invitees in order
'Sullivan v. State, 1o2 Ala. 135, 15 So. 264 (1894); State v. Jackson, 227 S.S. 271,
87 S.E.2d 681 (1955); Carter v. State, 3o Tex Ct. App. R. 551, 17 S.W. 1102 (1891).
PState v. Davis, 214 S.C. 34, 51 S.E.2d 86 (1948); State v. Osborne, 200 S.C. 504,
21 S.E.2d 178 (1942); State v. McGee, 185 S.C. 184, 193 S.E. 303 (1937); State v. Gor-
don 128 S.C. 422, 122 S.E. 5oi (1924); State v. Marlowe, 120 S.C. 205, 112 S.E. 921
(1922); State v. Burdette, ii8 S.C. 164, 101 S.E. 664 (igig); State v. Summer, 55 S.C. 32,
32 S.E. 77, (1899); State v. McIntosh, 4o S.C. 349, 18 S.E. 1o33 (1894); State v.
Trammell, 40 S.C. 331, 198 S.E. 940 (1894).
"126 S.E.2d 846 (S.C. 1962).
uid. at 851.
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to have the jury determine whether the South Carolina rules relating
to parties at fault or rules relating to parties not a fault should be ap-
plied. If the rules relating to parties not at fault apply, under the
dissenting judge's view, the defendant should have the benefit of an
instruction that he would not be required to retreat until he had been
asked to leave.
12
In support of his view concerning invitees, the dissenting judge
cited the prior South Carolina case of State v. McIntosh.3 The Mc-
In tosh case did place emphasis on the special status of the parties as
invitee and guest,1 4 but it is not directly on point as the householder
was the person who killed and not the victim as in the Betha'5 case.
Rather than stretching the rule applied in McIntosh's to fit the
peculiar situation in Betha,'1 a stronger argument could be made for
making an exception to the retreat rule, under which an invitee in
a home is not required to retreat when he is not at fault in inducing
an encounter with his host or hostess. South Carolina follows the re-
treat doctrine' s but has been liberal in modifying and refining the
rule so that under certain conditions one who is feloniously attacked
does not need to retreat.19 For example, State v. Davis,20 recognized
that a person without fault assaulted on his own premises is under
no duty to retreat and may stand his ground and use necessary force
to repel the attack, even to the extent of killing the assailant. The
court said this is "true whether the attack occurs in the defendant's
home, place of business, or elsewhere on property owned or law-
fully occupied by him."2 ' Such a broad rule eliminates most situations
from the retreat rule, and an exception in the Bethea2 2 case could
be justified on the ground that the defendant was on property "law-
fully occupied by him."
"Ibid.
"State v. McIntosh, 40 S.C. 349, 18 S.E. 1o3 (1849). The deceased, while in the
.defendant's house was urged by the defendant to take part in a Christmas party.
The party was a drunken debauch during which the defendant killed his guest.
The court explained that the defendant was not entitled to any right to protect
his home from an invited guest until he had first given the invitee a notice to leave.
"State v. McIntosh, 40 S.C. 349, 18 S.E. 1o33 (1894).
21See note io supra.
'-See note 14 supra.
'-See note io supra.
'1See note 9 supra.
'-State v. Davis, 214 S.C. 34, 51 S.E.2d 86 (1948); State v. Marlowe, 12o S.C. 2o5,
112 S.E. 921 (1922); State v. Osborne, aoo S.C. 5o4, 21 S.E.2d 178 (1942). See generally,
Perkins, Criminal Law 9o2 (1957).
'-State v. Davis, 214 S.C. 34, 51 S.E.2d 86 (1948).
2-Id. at 87.
'-See note io supra.
